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Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION JIDDA INFO ALL NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN DIP POSTS EXCEPT NEW DELHI BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS DACCA COLOMBO KATHMANDU AUG 25.

QUOTE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 227144

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: MASS, MILI, SA, US

SUBJECT: TEXT OF BUCKLEY BACKGROUNDER AUGUST 24, 1981

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE BUCKLEY BACKGROUNDER ON AWACS:

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED - MR. FISCHER: GOOD AFTERNOON.

AS YOU KNOW THIS AFTERNOON WE ARE HAVING A BACKGROUND BRIEFING PRECEDED BY A FORMAL ON-CAMERA, ON THE RECORD STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY JAMES BUCKLEY ON THE PROPOSED SALE OF AWACS TO SAUDI ARABIA

SENATOR BUCKLEY?

UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY. GOOD AFTERNOON

TODAY WE ADVISED THE CONGRESS OF OUR DECISION TO SELL CERTAIN AIR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA. THE PROPOSED SALE IS A CORNERSTONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY TO STRENGTHEN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST. AS SUCH, IT IS AN EARNEST COMMITMENT AND DETERMINATION TO DEFEND THE AREA.

WE CONFRONT A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF TODAY. THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR, AND THE INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN ETHIOPIA AND SOUTH YEMEN ARE ALL INDICATIVE OF A GROWING THREAT TO U.S. AND WESTERN INTERESTS. THE PRESIDENT AND THIS ADMINISTRATION ARE DETERMINED TO REVERSE THIS DANGEROUS TREND, TO PROTECT INTERESTS VITAL TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS FRIENDS, AND TO WORK WITH COUNTRIES IN THE AREA TO ENHANCE REGIONAL SECURITY.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT PROVIDING SAUDI ARABIA WITH THE PROPOSED EQUIPMENT WILL NOT ONLY HELP IT MEET ITS OWN LEGITIMATE NEEDS BUT WILL STRENGTHEN OUR OWN POSTURE IN THE REGION AND MAKE IT CLEAR TO BOTH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAT THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO ASSIST IN PRESERVING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN SOUTHWEST ASIA.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT SAUDI ACQUISITION OF THIS EQUIPMENT. LET ME REAFFIRM THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND WILL ENSURE THAT ISRAEL MAINTAINS ITS SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE OVER POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES. IN SHORT, WE WILL NOT ALLOW THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF FORCES TO BE AFFECTED BY THE SALE.

BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE RESTORATION OF U.S. STRENGTH AND CREDIBILITY IN THE REGION AND PROGRESS IN RESOLVING REGIONAL DISPUTES OFFER THE BEST LONG-TERM GUARANTEE OF SECURITY TO ISRAEL AS WELL AS TO OTHER STATES IN THE AREA WISHING TO REMAIN FREE OF SOVIET PRESSURE. THE ITEMS WE PROPOSE TO SELL TO SAUDI ARABIA WILL SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE ITS DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE PURSUIT OF U.S. STRATEGIC GOALS.

THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THAT THIS SALE IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROTECTION OF VITAL U.S. INTERESTS. THE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WHICH IT WILL BE MADE WILL ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE JEOPARDIZING THE INTERESTS OF ANY ONE OF THEM.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE TODAY PROVIDED THE HILL WITH INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROPOSED SALE, THE 20-DAY INFORMAL NOTIFICATION PERIOD WILL NOT BEGIN RUNNING UNTIL THE CONGRESS' RETURN ON SEPTEMBER 8TH. WE EXPECT TO FILE FORMAL NOTIFICATION ON THE 30TH, WHICH MEANS THAT ANY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION MUST BE TAKEN NO LATER THAN OCTOBER 30TH.

SENIOR OFFICIAL: MY ASSOCIATES AND I WOULD NOW BE PLEASED TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS ON BACKGROUND. BEGIN LOU - Q ON BACKGROUND, AS YOU HAVE POINTED OUT, IN VIEW OF THE PERMANENCE OF U.S. CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL WITH THESE AIRCRAFT FOR THE LIFE OF THE AIRCRAFT, COULD YOU GIVE SOME DETAILS AS TO WHO, HOW MANY? WILL THERE BE MILITARY PERSONNEL, U.S. CIVILIANS? WILL WE HAVE CLOSE ENGAGEMENT WITH EITHER OF THEM FOR THE SAME RESULT?

A. THE UNITED STATES WILL BE IN CHARGE; THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE IN CHARGE TO CONTRACT THIS. BUT PERHAPS I WOULD ASK MY COLLEAGUE TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION.

A. WE WILL HAVE BOTH UNIFORMED MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL -- CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL -- PRESENT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS THROUGHOUT THE LIFE OF THE PROGRAM.

WE ESTIMATE THAT AT THE TIME OF THE DELIVERY OF THE FIRST AWACS, WHICH WOULD BE IN LATE CALENDAR YEAR 1985, THAT THERE WOULD BE AN AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THE VICINITY OF 400-PLUS PERSONNEL. THAT WOULD INCLUDE APPROXIMATELY 30 U.S. AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WHO WOULD BE IN THE BUSINESS OF TRAINING AND CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION, AND THE BALANCE WOULD BE CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL. IN THIS GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT CONTRACT, BOEING CORPORATION WOULD BE THE PRINCIPAL CONTRACTOR.

THE LAST PART OF YOUR QUESTION WAS WHAT KIND OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD WE HAVE?

Q. THE YEAR WE WOULD BE ON BOARD THE PLANES.

A. FROM TIME TO TIME THEY WILL BE ON BOARD THE AIRPLANES AS THE TRAINING PROGRAM DEVELOPS.

INITIALLY, THERE WILL BE AMERICAN PERSONNEL ON THE AIRPLANES. AND, OF COURSE, THAT AMERICAN PRESENCE ON THE AIRPLANES WILL PROBABLY DIMINISH, AND EVEN FADE AWAY, DEPENDING ON HOW THE TRAINING PROGRAM COMES ALONG.

THE QUESTION ABOUT SO-CALLED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT -- THESE WOULD BE STANDARD FOR U.S. CONTRACTS IN OVERSEAS AREAS, AND IT PROVIDES A GREAT DEAL OF FLEXIBILITY FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN THE EVENT OF CONTINGENCIES.

Q. THE STATEMENT REFERS TO THE CONTENTION THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY UNAUTHORIZED USE OF AWACS COULD GO UNDETECTED. WHAT DOES "AUTHORIZED" AND "UNAUTHORIZED" MEAN IN THIS CONTEXT? WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE AN UNAUTHORIZED USE, AND WHAT SPECIFICALLY SAYS THAT IT'S UNAUTHORIZED?

A. WHEN THE CONTRACT IS EXECUTED SUBSEQUENT TO THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL, THERE WILL BE CERTAIN STIPULATIONS [illegible] AS OUR FMS AGREEMENTS -- FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AGREEMENTS -- INCLUDING [illegible] THE DETAILS OF COURSE WILL BE NEGOTIATED TO [illegible], AS THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS COME ALONG. BUT THEY ARE, IN GENERAL, THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

-- THIRD COUNTRY EXCLUSION. THAT MEANS NO THIRD-COUNTRY PERSONNEL ARE AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THE TECHNOLOGY NOR IS ANY TRANSFER OF THIS TECHNOLOGY OR INFORMATION REGARDING IT TO A THIRD COUNTRY AUTHORIZED.

-- PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, WHICH ARE EXTENSIVE -- THAT IS THE GENERAL AREA OF PROTECTION OF THE TECHNOLOGY. THIS WILL BE CAREFULLY SPELLED OUT.

-- THERE WILL BE SOME OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS SPELLED OUT.

; AND I THINK THAT PRETTY WELL TAKES CARE OF THE GENERAL AREAS.

Q. OF WHAT NATURE? OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS OF WHAT NATURE?

A. THERE WILL BE SOME AGREEMENT ABOUT THE AREA IN WHICH THE AIRCRAFT IS AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE.

Q. COULD YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC?

A. I DON'T THINK I CAN AT THIS POINT.

Q. ISRAEL HAS SAID THIS AIRCRAFT WILL STRIP IT BARE OF ITS MILITARY SECRETS. YET, YOU SAY IT WILL ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF ALL FRIENDLY STATES IN THE REGION.

HOW DO YOU PUT THOSE STATEMENTS TOGETHER? WHAT ASSURANCES DO YOU HAVE THAT THIS AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE USED TO IMPERIL ISRAEL'S SECURITY?

A. THERE'S A FOLKLORE MYSTIQUE THAT SEEMS TO HAVE GROWN UP AROUND THIS EQUIPMENT THAT LEADS PEOPLE TO BELIEVE IT CAN READ SEALED ENVELOPES ON PEOPLE'S DESKS.

THE FACT IS, AND AS IT'S SPELLED OUT IN THIS PAPER AND AS WE WILL BE SPELLING OUT IN GREAT DETAIL IN CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, WHAT THIS IS IS A PLATFORM IN THE AIR THAT CONTAINS RADAR. IT CAN COUNT AN AWFUL LOT OF PLANES FLYING AT SIGNIFICANT DISTANCES. IT CAN ALSO RELAY PERTINENT COMMAND INFORMATION TO AN AIRCRAFT DESIGNED TO INTERCEPT THOSE ENEMY PLANES. SO TO SAY THAT IT WILL STRIP ISRAEL BARE, FRANKLY, IS A LITTLE EXAGGERATED. IT WILL DO NOTHING OF THE SORT.

BY THE SAME TOKEN, THIS EQUIPMENT IS MILITARILY ESSENTIAL TO THE DEFENSE OF CRITICALLY IMPORTANT OIL FIELDS AND FACILITIES IN THE EASTERN PART OF SAUDI ARABIA -- OIL FIELDS THAT REPRESENT OVER 60 PER CENT OF THE ENERGY THAT COMES OUT OF THE PERSIAN GULF. THAT WHICH ENHANCES THE ABILITY TO PROTECT THOSE ASSETS CLEARLY ENHANCES THE SECURITY OF ALL COUNTRIES IN THAT AREA -- INCLUDING THE SECURITY OF PEOPLE DEPENDENT ON THAT OIL, INCLUDING THE ISRAELIS.

Q. THE STATEMENT THAT YOU HANDED OUT, OR THE BOOKLET ON THE WEAPON SYSTEM, ON PAGE 8 HAS A STATEMENT AT THE TOP THAT "ALTHOUGH AWACS DERIVED INFORMATION COULD PROVIDE SOME WARNING OF PREEMPTIVE ISRAELI AIRSTRIKES, SUCH WARNING WOULD NOT ALTER THE OVERALL ISRAELI MILITARY SUPERIORITY OR THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF A WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES."

DOES THAT MEAN THAT, BASICALLY, WHILE, INDEED -- IF SAUDI ARABIA HAD AWACS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF SAUDI ARABIA AND PICKED UP ISRAELI JETS -- SAY, ON THEIR WAY TO ANOTHER IRAQI REACTOR RAID -- THAT THAT SORT OF ATTACK WOULD, INDEED, BE DETECTABLE BUT THAT ISRAEL SHOULDN'T REALLY HAVE TO WORRY BECAUSE WHILE IT MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO CONDUCT SUCHPREEMPTIVESTRIKES

SUCCESSFULLY, THAT OVERALL IN A WAR IT'S GOT SUPERIORITY SO IT SHOULDN'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT PREEMPTIVE STRIKES?

A. I THINK THE WHOLE THING HAS TO BE PUT IN CONTEXT, AND THE CONTEXT IS THAT FOR THE SAUDIS TO BE THAT CLOSE TO ISRAEL WOULD BE VERY VISIBLE ON ISRAELI DETECTORS -- RADAR AND OTHERWISE -- AND THE LONGEVITY OF SUCH AN AIRCRAFT WOULD BE PREDICTABLY SHORT-LIVED.

NUMBER 2, IN THE CONTEXT OF A DEFENSE AGAINST PREEMPTIVE AND OTHER STRIKES, THE NORMAL OPERATIONS WOULD REQUIRE THAT THE AIRCRAFT OF THE OTHER ADJOINING ARAB STATES WOULD BE CONNECTED IN ELECTRONICALLY WITH THE EQUIPMENT ON BOARD THE AWACS. THAT CANNOT BE DONE WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES PUTTING THAT EQUIPMENT IN, SO WE HAVE TOTAL CONTROL OVER THAT SITUATION.

THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS BY A VOICE COMMAND -- WHICH IS SOMETHING THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD JAM, COULD HANDLE. SO, YES, IF THE SAUDIS WANTED TO JEOPARDIZE THE AIRCRAFT -- THE AWACS AIRCRAFT -- AND LEAVE NAKED THEIR MOST IMPORTANT ASSETS, THEY COULD GO TO THE NORTHWEST, AND IF THEY HAPPEN TO BE AROUND JUST AS THE ISRAELIS WERE PLANNING A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE, SEND OUT WARNINGS THAT SO MANY AIRCRAFT HAD JUST STARTED OFF IN SUCH-AND-SUCH A DIRECTION, WHICH MAY GIVE NO CLUE WHATSOEVER AS TO THE DESTINATION OF THAT AIRCRAFT.

Q. TO FOLLOW THAT UP, THE EQUIPMENT THAT THE ARAB NATIONS WOULD NEED THAT ONLY THE UNITED STATES HAS -- WHAT IS THAT? IS THAT AWACS?

A. NO. IT'S THE ELECTRONIC STUFF THAT INTERPRETS THE SIGNAL COMING OUT OF AWACS. THAT STUFF HAS TO GO DOWN. IT'S -- WELL, AGAIN, PERHAPS WE NEED A TECHNICAL EXPLANATION.

Q. THE REASON WHY I ASKED THAT: I'M WONDERING WHAT HAPPENS IF THE BRITISH OR THE FRENCH SOLD THEIR EQUIVALENCE OF AWACS TO OTHER ARAB NATIONS. ARE YOU SAYING THAT WOULDN'T DO THE JOB OF COORDINATING?

A. I'M SAYING THAT THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH -- IT WOULD BE UP TO THEM WHETHER OR NOT THEY'D SUPPLY THE SYRIANS AND THEJORDANIANS WITHCOMPATIBLE EQUIPMENT TO TIE IN JORDANIAN AND SYRIAN AIRCRAFT TO THE

NIMROD, OR WHATEVER IT IS, THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD THEN HAVE.

Q. YES, BUT THIS STATEMENT SAYS THAT THE UNITED STATES -- IT'S THE EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR A COORDINATED ATTACK OR A COORDINATED DEFENSE AGAINST A PREEMPTIVE ATTACK IS IN THE CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT'S WHY I'M ASKING THAT. IS WHAT YOU'RE SAYING THAT THAT IS NOT EXACTLY RIGHT -- THAT MAYBE IF THE FRENCH OR THE BRITISH DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD SELL COMPARABLE EQUIPMENT THAT THERE COULD BE A COORDINATION?

A. NO, NO. I SAID IF THEY SOLD SOMETHING EQUIVALENT TO THE AWACS. IN OTHER WORDS, IF THE BRITISH WERE TO SUPPLY A TOTAL SYSTEM, IT COULD BE JUST THAT -- TOTAL. WE WON'T.
Q. TO THE SAUDIS?

A. TO THE SAUDIS -- AND NEIGHBORING STATES.

Q. A LOT OF THE ARGUMENTS IN HERE, AND SOME OF THOSE PRESENTED BY YOURSELF AND YOUR COLLEAGUE, ARE QUITE REMINISCENT OF THE CASE MADE BY THE FORD ADMINISTRATION FOR SALES TO THE SHAH OF IRAN -- INCLUDING PROPOSED AWACS SALES -- AND, AS IT TURNED OUT, THAT WORKED AGAINST THEM. THAT WAS ONE OF THE RALLYING CRIES OF THE MUSLIM RELIGIOUS FERVOR AND IRANIAN NATIONALISM.

WHAT GUARANTEE HAVE WE GOT THAT HISTORY WON'T REPEAT ITSELF AND THAT THIS WOULD EVEN BE A PRETEXT FOR NATIONALISTIC UPRISINGS AGAINST THIS TIE WITH THE UNITED STATES?

A. THERE ARE SO MANY DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA THAT I THINK THE BEST THINGS I CAN DO IS TO INVITE MY COLLEAGUE HERE TO ADDRESS THEM. BUT, REALLY, YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT TWO TOTALLY DIFFERENT SOCIETIES.

A. IF WE WERE TO HAVE A NATIONALISTIC, ANTI-AMERICAN, EARTHQUAKE-SHAKING SAUDI ARABIA OVER THE DEPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT, THIS WOULD HAVE COME NOT AS A RESULT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF SAUDI-OWNED AIRCRAFT, BUT YOU WOULD HAVE EXPECTED IT AS A RESULT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE TO SAUDI ARABIA IN 1979.
WE ALL KNOW THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN, AND IT'S NOT GOING TO HAPPEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF SAUDI-OWNED AIRCRAFT.

NOW, THAT WAS YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTION.

AS FAR AS DIFFERENCES, THIS GETS YOU AROUND TO THE QUESTION: IS SAUDI ARABIA STABLE?

THERE ARE THOSE WHO SAY IT ISN'T. WE BELIEVE THAT THEY'RE WRONG.

IF YOU TAKE IRAN, YOU FIND AN ISOLATED LEADER -- INCREASINGLY, AS IT TURNED OUT, ABSTRACTED FROM HIS OWN SOCIETY.

THOSE OF YOU WHO KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA REALIZE THAT THE SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY IS AN EXTREMELY LARGE AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNING AND COHESIVE INSTRUMENT, THAT THIS ROYAL FAMILY HAS DEEP TIES WITH THE TRADITIONAL AND RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIETY; AND, ALSO, ITS YOUNGER MEMBERS ARE TRAINED -- MOSTLY IN THE UNITED STATES -- AND THEY ARE VERY IMPORTANT AS LEADERS IN THE MODERNIZING SECTORS OF THE SOCIETY.

LET'S ADDRESS THE MECCA MOSQUE INCIDENT. IT HAPPENED, BUT IT WAS A SMOKE. IN RETROSPECT, ON THE BASIS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO US, WE CONCLUDE IT WAS AN ABERRANT ONE. IT WAS NOT THE KIND OF ANTI-WESTERN GROUNDS EVEN IT WAS A SMALL GROUP OF OFFSHOOT, SPLINTER ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS. AND THE REASON IT TOOK THE SAUDIS SO LONG TO GET IT UNDER CONTROL WAS THEY DIDN'T WANT TO DESTROY THE HOLIEST SITE IN ISLAM IN ORDER TO DO IT.

SO WE DO NOT SEE AN IRANIAN REPEAT IN SAUDI ARABIA ON THE BASIS OF THE OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE.
Q. COULD YOU -- I'M NOT CLEAR EXACTLY WHAT THE RESTRAINTS ARE ON THE DISSEMINATION OR THE USE OF THE INFORMATION GOING FROM THE AWACS. I UNDERSTAND THE IMPEDIMENTS TO COORDINATED USE IN WARTIME. BUT, IN GENERAL, WHAT ARE THE RESTRAINTS ON THE USE OF THE INFORMATION?

A. I'M NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO GET INTO ANY DETAIL HERE, AND I MEAN THAT LITERALLY. UNDERSCORE "ANY" DETAIL.

WHAT I CAN SAY IS THAT WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE SAUDIS ON ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING THE SALE AND USE OF THE AWACS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT WHICH SATISFY BASIC U.S. NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS.

NOW, THESE ARRANGEMENTS COVER AS SUGGESTED BY MY COLLEAGUE, LIMITATIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF DATA AND EQUIPMENT TO THIRD PARTIES, U.S. ACCESS TO DATA GENERATED BY THE SAUDI AWACS, THE PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES REQUIRED TO PROTECT THE AWACS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT, AND THE AREA OF OPERATION FOR THE AWACS.

OBVIOUSLY, THE DETAILS ARE TERRIBLY IMPORTANT; BUT, FRANKLY, WE'RE NOT GOING TO LET THOSE OUT UNTIL WE HAVE A CHANCE TO LET THEM OUT TO THE CONGRESS DIRECTLY. WE BELIEVE THAT'S OUR OBLIGATION TO THE CONGRESS

Q. WHAT IF SAUDI ARABIA WERE TO VIOLATE THESE AGREEMENTS? WHAT WOULD THE UNITED STATES HAVE AS OPTIONS?

A. THERE, IN EFFECT, WOULD BE ONE TIME VIOLATIONS -- FOR THE REASON, NUMBER 1, WE WOULD KNOW THAT THEY OCCURRED; AND, NUMBER 2, THAT THIS EQUIPMENT IS TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON U.S. MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT AND SUPPLY. THE EQUIPMENT IS OF A FRAGILITY AND SO FORTH THAT IT SIMPLY CAN'T GO VERY LONG WITHOUT --

Q. BUT THAT WOULD BE THE ONLY RETRIBUTION, REALLY, TO STOP IT.

A. WE GOT ALL THE TRADITIONAL RETRIBUTION ROUTES THAT ONE COUNTRY HAS AGAINST ANOTHER IF THERE'S A VIOLATION OF A VERY IMPORTANT AGREEMENT.

Q. DO THE SAUDIS ACCEPT THESE CONDITIONS?

A. YOU CAN'T HAVE AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE. THAT'S IN THE DEFINITION OF OF AN "AGREEMENT."

Q. AND ARE THESE CONDITIONS GENERALLY APPLIED IN THE CASE OF SUPPLYING RADAR PLANES TO OTHER PARTS OF--

A. I'M NOT GOING TO BE BRACKETED, SIR. I'M SAYING WHAT I HAVE TO SAY AND WILL HAVE TO LEAVE IT AT THAT.

Q. FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, DON'T YOU THINK THAT THESE SUCH CONDITIONS WOULD BE OFFENSIVE TO THE SAUDIS -- THAT YOU'RE TELLING THEM WHAT EXACTLY TO DO WITH THE EQUIPMENT, WHERE TO EMPLOY THEM -- DON'T --

A. NO. TWO SOVEREIGN NATIONS REACH AN AGREEMENT AS TO EQUIPMENT WHICH ONE HAS AND ANOTHER WOULD LIKE TO HAVE. BUT WE HAVE REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO EQUIPMENT WE SELL TO NATO, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND -- ANY COUNTRY THAT YOU CAN THINK OF - SO THERE'S NOTHING UNUSUAL ABOUT RESTRICTIONS. THEY MUST, IN DOING THIS, AS A CONDITION FOR OUR RELEASE OF EQUIPMENT.

Q. ONE FINAL POINT: DO YOU HAVE SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS ON HAWKEYES SUPPLIED TO ISRAEL -- I THINK THEY HAVE FOUR OF THEM -- ABOUT AREAS OF USE, ABOUT TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND SHARING OF INFORMATION?

A. WELL, HAWKEYES DON'T GENERATE INFORMATION. THE OBJECT OF AN AWACS IS TO GENERATE INFORMATION.

Q. IS THIS THE SAME KIND OF AN AWACS THAT THE UNITED STATES FLIES AROUND? IS IT OF THAT LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION?

A. NO. WHAT WE FLY AROUND IS MORE SOPHISTICATED THAN WHAT NATO FLIES AROUND, WHICH IS MORE SOPHISTICATED THAN WHAT THE SAUDIS WILL BE FLYING AROUND.

Q. IS THERE ANYTHING BELOW THAT IN THE AWACS FRAME?

A. LOOK, AN AWACS IS JUST AN AIRFRAME; AND YOU CAN STUFF IT WITH ALL KINDS OF THINGS. TALK TO ABOUT THE HARDWARE. THE HARDWARE IN THAT EQUIPMENT IS, FRANKLY, NOTHING VERY REVOLUTIONARY OR NEW. IT'S 1960S EQUIPMENT. THE COMPUTERS ARE COMMERCIAL COMPUTERS. AND THERE ARE CERTAIN THINGS OF HIGH SENSITIVITY THAT, YES, WE HAVE ON OUR OWN, BUT, NO, WE'RE NOT BEYOND THESE -- FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT WE ALWAYS DRAW THIS KIND OF DISTINCTION IN ANY OVERSEAS SALE.

Q. CAN I ASK TWO QUESTIONS? ARE THERE RESTRICTIONS ON WHERE THE ENHANCED F-15S CAN OPERATE?

A. THE RESTRICTIONS ARE THE STANDARD RESTRICTIONS IN TERMS OF BEING DEFENSIVE -- DEFENSIVE USE.

Q. CAN THEY APPROACH THE ISRAELI BORDER? IS THAT UNDER RESTRICTION? AND CAN THEY --

A. I'M NOT GOING TO BE BRACKETED - SORRY.

Q. DO YOU WANT TO RESPOND SPECIFICALLY TO THE CHARGES IN THAT "NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE THAT THE U.S. WILL HAVE NO POWER TO PREVENT THEM FROM BEING USED AGAINST ISRAEL?

A. I THINK THAT WHAT I JUST SAID DEMONSTRATES THAT THAT WAS AN UNINFORMED ARTICLE.

Q. AND DO YOU ALSO DENY THAT SECOND CLAIM THAT THE -- "NOR HAS THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT AGREED TO RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE"? YOU SAY THAT'S SPECIFICALLY UNTRUE?

A. BOTH ARE DENIED.

Q. THANK YOU.

Q. COULD WE TALK ABOUT THE LEGISLATIVE TIMETABLE? FORMAL NOTIFICATION GOES UP THE 30TH. THAT GIVES 30 DAYS. IN THAT PERIOD, PRESIDENT REAGAN IS GOING TO MEET WITH CROWN PRINCE FAHD AT CANCUN.

IS THERE ANY DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE ADMINISTRATION, AND HAVE YOU TALKED TO SENATOR PERCY AND HOWARD BAKER, ABOUT WHEN THE HEARINGS WILL BE HELD AND WHEN THE VOTE WILL BE TAKEN?

A. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, NOTHING HAS BEEN SAID WITH RESPECT TO EITHER. EARLIER ON THERE WAS CONCERN ABOUT OUR SUBMITTING THESE MATTERS DURING THE LAST TIME CONGRESS WAS IN SESSION, FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS OTHER LEGISLATION THAT HAD A PRIORITY.

Q. THE REASON I'M ASKING IS BECAUSE AN ARMS PACKAGE OF THIS MAGNITUDE AND ALL THE CONSEQUENCES ATTENDANT UPON IT, IS THAT GOING TO BE ENOUGH TIME, IF SOME MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, SAY SENATOR GLENN WHO IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, DECIDE THAT THEY ARE GOING TO TAKE THEIR TIME ABOUT THIS?

A. IT IS IN THE NATURE OF BIFORCATED GOVERNMENT THAT THE EXECUTIVE MAY HAVE ITS BRUTHERS IN TERMS OF SCHEDULING, BUT THE CONGRESS HAS ITS PROCEDURES AND SO ON. AND IN EFFECT, YOU'LL BE ABLE TO SCHEDULE NO MEETINGS OF ANY KIND IF ANYTHING CONTROVERSIAL WERE GOING TO COME UP ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE.

Q. SIR, IN THIS BRIEFING PAPER, THERE IS NO REFERENCE AT ALL TO SOMETHING THAT YOUR COLLEAGUE ALLUDED TO, WHICH IS THE FACT THAT SAUDI ARABIA CURRENTLY IS PROTECTED BY AWACS PLANES BASED IN THEIR COUNTRY THAT ARE U.S. AIR FORCE AWACS PLANES.

IN THE WHOLE DISCUSSION OF THE DEFENCE NEEDS OF SAUDI ARABIA IS WRITTEN AS IF THEY HAD NO AWACS PLANES NOW, AND UNTIL THIS SCALE GOES THROUGH, THEY WILL HAVE NONE. CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHY SAUDI OWNERSHIP OF AWACS PLANES DOES ANYTHING MORE FOR THEIR DEFENSE THAN IS

BEING PROVIDED RIGHT NOW BY HIGHLY PROFICIENT U.S. AIR FORCE CREWS FLYING U.S. AIR FORCE AWACS PLANES, WHICH YOU JUST FINISHED TELLING US ARE EVEN BETTER THAN THE ONES WE ARE PREPARED TO SELL THE SAUDIS?

A. CERTAINLY. THE FACT IS THAT SAUDI ARABIA IS A SOVEREIGN NATION THAT DOES NOT WANT TO BE AT THE PLEASURE, IN TERMS OF ITS VITAL DEFENSES, OF SOME OTHER NATION. THIS IS A VERY REASONABLE THING FOR A NATION TO BE. THEREFORE, IT WANTS TO HAVE ITS OWN EQUIPMENT, SUBJECT TO ITS COMMAND. THIS IS NATURAL AND NORMAL.

IT HAS MADE CLEAR THAT IT HAS THIS DESIRE, AND AS WE DO NOT HAVE A MONOPOLY ON THIS KIND OF AERIAL RADAR PLATFORM, THEY HAVE AN OPTION IN THE MATTER. THE OPTION IS TO GO AND BUY THE NIMROD FROM THE BRITISH.

Q. WHAT WOULD BE THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IF THEY CHOSE TO PHASE OUT OUR AIR FORCE AWACS AND REPLACE THEM IN FIVE YEARS OR SO WITH NIMRODS THEY WOULD OWN? WHY WOULD THAT BE BAD FOR THE UNITED STATES?

A. FOR SEVERAL REASONS, BECAUSE IF WE KEPT SOME AS A RESULT OF A PERCEPTION THAT WE WOULD NOT SUPPLY THE SAUDIS, IT RAISES INTO QUESTION THE SECURITY OF OUR AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. IF OUR MILITARY AGREES WITH THEIR MILITARY THAT THIS EQUIPMENT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE DEFENSE OF THEIR MOST IMPORTANT ASSETS, AND IF WE, NEVERTHELESS, REFUSE TO TURN IT OVER -- IF THAT IS THEIR PERCEPTION -- THEN IT REFLECTS ON THEIR FEELING OF AMERICAN RELIABILITY IN LONG-TERM COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.

IT IS KEY TO OUR THINKING ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF THAT WE BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIPS OF THIS KIND WITH ALL OF THE PERIPHERAL STATES SO THAT, IN COMBINATION, WE CAN PROVIDE A CREDIBLE DETERRENCE TO ANY ATTACK ON THE OIL FIELDS IN THAT AREA AND ON THE SHIPPING LANES.

SECONDLY, IT IS VERY MUCH TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO HAVE OUR EQUIPMENT IN THE STOCK, IN THE INVENTORY, OF COUNTRIES WITH WHICH WE WANT TO DEVELOP CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS AND WHICH ARE LOCATED IN AREAS OF THE WORLD WHERE YOU COULD HAVE POTENTIAL TROUBLE, BECAUSE THIS MEANS YOU WILL HAVE ON THE SPOT AIR STRIPS OF THE RIGHT LENGTH, SUPPLY WAREHOUSES WITH THE RIGHT SUPPLIES, INDIVIDUALS WHO KNOW HOW TO HANDLE AND MAINTAIN THE EQUIPMENT AND SO FORTH, WHICH MEANS THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY, WE COULD RUSH IN MORE EQUIPMENT OF OUR OWN THAT WOULD FIND A COMPLETELY COMPATIBLE ENVIRONMENT.

Q. SIR, THE SOVEREIGN COUNTRY YOU'RE SPEAKING ABOUT, WILL THE UNITED STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO RESTRICT THIS COUNTRY FROM HIRING PALESTINIANS OR WHOMEVER THEY WISH, TO HELP OPERATE THEIR PLANE?

APART FROM TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY WHICH YOU, AND I BELIEVE YOUR COLLEAGUE HAVE COVERED, LIBYA, FOR INSTANCE, MUST REACH OUT -- AND OF COURSE, HAVING A LOT OF OIL MONEY, HAS NO PROBLEM FINDING HIRED HANDS TO OPERATE ITS EQUIPMENT.

WILL SAUDI ARABIA HAVE THAT RIGHT, OR WILL THERE ONLY BE AMERICANS OR SAUDIS ON THE PLANES?

A. I SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT LET MYSELF BE BRACKETED ON THE SECURITY OF EQUIPMENT RELATIONSHIPS.

Q. NO. PERSONNEL I'M TALKING ABOUT.

A. THIS IS PART OF SECURITY OF EQUIPMENT.

Q. WAIT A MINUTE. IS THAT THE END OF IT OR --

A. THE FACT IS THAT THE PROVISIONS ARE THAT ACCESS TO THIS EQUIPMENT, OPERATION OF THIS EQUIPMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO SAUDI AND AMERICAN NATIONALS.

Q. YOU HAVE SAID THAT YOU BELIEVED THAT THE REGIME, THE DYNASTY, IS STABLE; BUT IF THERE WERE TO BE A SUDDEN COUP FROM WITHIN, WHAT WOULD PREVENT THE SAUDI PERSONNEL, IF THEY WERE OVERTAKEN BY THE NEW REGIME, FROM FLYING THE PLANESAWAY? I AM SURE THAT YOU HAVE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR EVERYTHING, BUT WOULD THERE BE SOME WAY IN WHICH THE VERY COMPLEX EQUIPMENT COULD BE DESTROYED BY THE AMERICAN PERSONNEL BEFORE THEY WERE KILLED -- WE PRESUME THAT THEY WOULD BE, UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES?

A. I WOULD NOT WANT TO GO INTO CONTINGENCY PLANS, QUITE OBVIOUSLY, BUT I THINK IF YOU NEED THE DOCUMENT ON THE SECURITY ASPECTS HERE, YOU'LL FIND THAT THE HARDWARE -- THAT WHICH IS FLOWN AWAY -- REALLY DOES NOT HAVE THAT MUCH SENSITIVE VALUE TO IT. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT TECHNOLOGY WHICH CAN BE BOUGHT OFF THE SHELF, OR OF WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE THE EQUIVALENT.

WHAT IS SENSITIVE IS THE SOFTWARE, AND IF THAT IS COMPROMISED, WHAT WE PUT INTO THAT SOFTWARE CAN BE REVERSED IN THE MATTER OF DAYS, SO THAT YOU CAN PROTECT YOURSELF TO A VERY LARGE DEGREE IN THAT MANNER.

Q. IN OTHER WORDS, IT COULD BE REVERSED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE COMPUTER PROGRAMMING, IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE SAYING?

A. IT GETS BEYOND MY KEN.

Q. SINCE THE PLANES, SIR, ARE GOING TO BE SOLD TO SAUDI ARABIA, WHAT ROLE WILL THESE PLANES PLAY IN THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, JUST IN CASE OF ANY CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION?

A. THAT EQUIPMENT, LOCATED PERMANENTLY IN SAUDI ARABIA, WILL GREATLY ENHANCE THE COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES OF THE AREA IN MANY WAYS. FIRST OF ALL, WE WILL HAVE A RELATIONSHIP, AND IF THERE IS A THREAT TO THE AREA, WE WILL BE EXPECTED TO BE INVITED IN; AND THERE WOULD BE READY FOR US ALL OF THE ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES, AND SO ON, REQUIRED TO KEEP THOSE AWACS, AND ANY OTHERS THAT ARE BROUGHT IN, FLYING.

THE SAME THING WITH THE F-15S. THEY WILL BE AIRCRAFT THAT ARE OURS IN MANUFACTURE; THERE WILL BE AMERICAN TECHNICIANS ON THE GROUND AVAILABLE, IN A RAPID DEPLOYMENT SITUATION, TO SERVICE NOT ONLY THE SAUDI AIRCRAFT, BUT OTHERS THAT WE BRING IN, SO THAT IT GREATLY ENHANCES OUR CAPACITY TO MOVE QUICKLY IN AN EMERGENCY.

Q. IS IT CORRECT TO ASSUME, AT LEAST AT THE OUTSET OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM, THERE WOULD BE AMERICAN PERSONNEL ON THE SAUDI-OWNED AWAC PLANES?

A. INITIALLY, THERE WOULD BE. I BELIEVE IT WILL BE FOUR OR FIVE YEARS BEFORE THE FIRST AIRCRAFT COULD HAVE AN ALL-SAUDI CREW.

Q. FIVE YEARS.

A. FIVE YEARS. THEN, WITH RESPECT TO THE REST OF THE AIRCRAFT, YOU WOULD GRADUALLY BE BUILDING UP THEIR CAPACITIES.

Q. DOESN'T THIS RAISE THE POSSIBILITY THEN THAT IN A CRISIS SITUATION, ONE MIGHT SEE ISRAELI FIGHTER PLANES ENGAGING SAUDI-OWNED AWACS, ON WHICH AMERICAN PERSONNEL ARE STATIONED? I PUT THAT QUESTION TO YOU IN THE CONTEXT OF YOUR REFERENCE BEFORE TO THE LONGEVITY OF THE AWACS BEING SHORT-LIVED IN A CRISIS SITUATION, AND THE STATEMENT AND THE RATIONALE THAT TALKS ABOUT "SAUDI DEPLOYMENT OF AWACS NEAR ISRAEL WOULD PROVIDE LITTLE IMPROVEMENT TO SAUDI WARNING TIME, BUT WOULD DRAMATICALLY INCREASE THE VULNERABILITY OF AWACS TO ISRAELI ATTACK AND DESTRUCTION," THAT IS TO SAY, THE VULNERABILITY OF AWACS WITH AMERICANS ABOARD TO ISRAELI ATTACK AND DESTRUCTION.

HOW DO YOU REGARD THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH RESPECT TO ISRAEL NOW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THAT THE SAUDIS HAD, IN EFFECT, PUT THE UNITED STATES HOSTAGE TO SAUDI POLICY.

A. IF THERE ARE WAR-THREATENING OR CRISIS-THREATENING SITUATIONS, THERE IS AMPLE PROVISION UNDER OUR CONTRACTS, STANDARD CONTRACTS, AND LAW TO BE ABLE TO GET AMERICANS OUT. THERE IS NO WAY TO GUARANTEE THAT ANY AMERICANS STATIONED ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD WORKING WITH EQUIPMENT MIGHT NOT BE INVOLVED IN A TOTAL SURPRISE.

Q. CAN YOU PLEASE TELL US WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE $600 MILLION THAT WAS SUPPOSEDLY ASSURED TO ISRAEL AS A RESULT OF THE ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE SEVERAL MONTHS AGO? WHETHER THAT $600 MILLION TO BE SPREAD OUT OVER THE NEXT TWO FISCAL YEARS STILL IS IN EFFECT, NOW THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE OPPOSING THIS SALE, OR HAS THERE BEEN SOME CHANGE IN THAT?

A. WE ARE CONTINUING TO HAVE VERY CLOSE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS IN TERMS OF MAKING SURE THAT THEY MAINTAIN THE QUALITATIVE ADVANTAGES THAT THEY ENJOY, AND THAT THEY, IN FACT, RETAIN THE CAPABILITY TO HANDLE ANY COMBINATION OF FORCES. SO NOTHING HAS CHANGED IN TERMS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS.

Q. SIR, THERE IS NOTHING IN THIS REPORT THAT INDICATES THAT THE SAUDIS AND OTHER ARABS HAVE BEEN SAYING REPEATEDLY THAT THE ENEMY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS NOT THE SOVIET UNION, BUT ISRAEL; AND AS A MATTER OF FACT, SAUDI ARABIA IS PERMITTING SOVIET AIRCRAFT TO OVERFLY SAUDI ARABIA TO ITS BASES IN SOUTH YEMEN, IN ADEN, AND IN ETHIOPIA.

HOW DO YOU ACCOUNT FOR THIS EMPHASIS ON THE SOVIET MENACE WHEN THE ARABS THEMSELVES ARE SAYING SOMETHING DIFFERENT?

A. I WOULD CHALLENGE YOU TO FIND ANYONE LIVING IN THE GULF AREA THAT DOES NOT EXPRESS TREMENDOUS CONCERN OVER THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE A SOVIET CLIENT STATE IN SOUTH YEMEN -- WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, IS MILITARILY STRONGER THAN SAUDI ARABIA -- OR THAT YOU HAVE THE SOVIETS MOVING INTO AFGHANISTAN, OR THE IMPLICATIONS OF ANOTHER SOVIET PROXY IN ETHIOPIA. THE FACT THAT SOME ARAB STATES MAY SAY THERE IS ANOTHER COUNTRY AROUND THAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE A LARGER MENACE DOES NOT DIMINISH IN THE SLIGHTEST THE LOGIC OF THESE DEFENSE WEAPONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF THESE ASSETS IN EASTERN SAUDI ARABIA.

Q. MY POINT IS THAT IF THIS IS A FACT, WHY AREN'T THE ARABS SAYING THIS? WHY ARE WE ONLY SAYING THAT THE SOVIETS ARE THE ENEMY? AND AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE PRECIS SAYS, OR THIS RATIONALE SAYS, THAT THIS IS FOR THE AWACS OR THE PROTECTION OF ISRAEL AND ISRAEL IS PROTESTING IT. IN 40 YEARS OF DEALING WITH STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS, I HAVEN'T SEEN ONE THAT HAS SO MANY HOLES AS THIS ONE.

BUT I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW EXACTLY WHERE THE AWACS ARE PROTECTING ISRAEL, WHEN THE ISRAELIS ARE SAYING THE OTHER WAY, AND THE ARABS ARE SAYING ISRAEL IS THE ENEMY.

A. WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING THE SALE OF DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR THE BENEFIT OF ISRAEL; WE'RE DOING IT FOR THE BENEFIT OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE SECURITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF, IN WHICH THIS COUNTRY HAS A VERY IMPORTANT STAKE. WHAT WE ARE SAYING IS THAT TO THE DEGREE THAT THAT ENHANCES THE SECURITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, IN WHICH THERE IS A SOVIET UNION AND IN WHICH THERE IS A SOUTH YEMEN AND IN WHICH YOU DO HAVE A DESTABILIZED SITUATION IN IRAQ AND IRAN, IS ONE IN WHICH WE, IN FACT, SEE BENEFITS TO BE GAINED. AND THOSE BENEFITS ACCRUE TO ISRAEL.

Q. CAN WE SAFELY ASSUME SINCE THE EMPHASIS IS SO MUCH ON THE PROTECTION OF SAUDI ARABIA'S OIL RESOURCES THAT THE AWACS ARE GOING TO BE LIMITED IN THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA, AS YOUR COLLEAGUE SAID BEFORE, TO THE AREA WHERE MOST OF THE OIL IS?

A. YOU'RE TRYING TO BRACKET ME.

Q. I DON'T WANT TO BRACKET YOU; I'M TRYING TO DRAW SOME LOGICAL DEDUCTIONS FROM WHAT YOU'VE SAID AND WHAT YOUR COLLEAGUE HAS SAID.

A. THAT IS CERTAINLY THE LOGIC THAT WAS USED, BUT I'M NOT GOING TO GO BEYOND WHAT I SAID EARLIER ABOUT LIMITATIONS ON OPERATIONS.

Q. SIR, YOU HAVE MENTIONED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE BENEFITS THAT ACCRUE TO THE UNITED STATES IN USING THE GROUND EQUIPMENT AND OTHER FACILITIES THAT WE DEVELOPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SALE.

IS THERE GOING TO BE ANY CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR THE U.S. USE OF THESE FACILITIES, IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY? IS THERE ANYTHING ON PAPER THAT GUARANTEES THAT?

A. NOTHING ON PAPER THAT GUARANTEES IT. THE FACT IS THAT IN EMERGENCIES, YOU DON'T RELY ON PAPERS, OTHER THAN TO GIVE YOU ACCESS OR TO DENY YOU ACCESS. THE FACT IS, THERE IS A CONFLUENCE OF INTEREST; AND IF THERE IS A HISTORY OF A RELATIONSHIP, THEN ONE CAN ANTICIPATE THAT WE WOULD BE WELCOME, IF THERE WERE INDEED A THREAT IN THAT AREA

THE FACT IS, WE RUSHED AWACS INTO SAUDI ARABIA IN 1979 AS A RESULTOF THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE YEMEN. WE RUSHED THEM IN 1980 AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE IRAQI-IRANIAN WAR. IN NEITHER CASE, DID WE HAVE A FORMAL CONTRACT ENTITLING US TO ACCESS.

Q. WHILE THIS IS STILL ON BACKGROUND, I WONDER

IF YOU COULD TELL US IF YOU HAVE ANY HEAD COUNT ON THE HILL ON THIS PACKAGE?

A. I HAVE NO CURRENT HEAD COUNT. WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT IT'S GOING TO BE AN UPHILL FIGHT, BUT WE ARE CONFIDENT, VERY CONFIDENT THAT THE SHEER LOGIC OF WHAT WE ARE PROPOSING IS SO OVERWHELMING AS TO GUARANTEE THIS SALE.

WE HAVE NOT IN THE PAST BEEN ABLE TO LAY OUT EVERYTHING TO MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO MAKE AN ASSERTION ABOUT THIS OR THAT ASPECT OF AN AGREEMENT UNTIL WE WERE SURE WE HAD ONE.

Q. SIR, WHAT ARE THE PAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS? IS IT A STRAIGHT CASH DEAL?

A. I ASSUME SO.

Q. IN THE DOCUMENTS THAT WENT FROM THE DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY TO THE HILL, THERE IS A LISTING OF SOME OF THE GEAR THAT'S LEFT OFF THE AWACS PLANES THAT INCLUDES COMMUNICATIONS GEAR, ELECTRONIC COUNTER-COUNTER MEASURES, ET CETERA. ARE THESE SYSTEMS SPECIFICALLY OMITTED TO HELP ALLAY THE FEARS OF THE ISRAELIS THAT THESE AIRCRAFT MIGHT BE USED TO COORDINATE AN ATTACK ON ISRAEL?
A. I THINK I HAD BETTER ASK THE EXPERT TO ADDRESS THAT.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: I DIDN'T HEAR THE WHOLE QUESTION, BUT IT HAD TO DO WITH THE EXCLUSIONS FROM AWACS?

Q. WHAT IS EXCLUDED, SIR, SOMETHING CALLED JTIDS, THE ECCM EQUIPMENT, HAVQUICK (PHONETIC), UHF COMMUNICATIONS MODIFICATION--

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: MOSTLY COMMUNICATIONS OR ELECTRONIC ITEMS THAT CANNOT BE RELEASED BECAUSE OF SECURITY REASONS. THEY WOULD NOT BE RELEASED TO OTHER COUNTRIES -- COUNTRY X WE WOULD NOT RELEASE IT TO THE JTIDS WE WILL RELEASE TO NATO ONLY, SO THEY ALL FALL UNDER THE GENERAL CATEGORY OF SECURITY DELETES. IN GENERAL, IT'S BECAUSE OF THE INCRIPTION DEVICES WITH THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY INVOLVED.

Q. DO THESE DELETIONS HINDER THE AWACS FROM BEING

USED AS A COORDINATING AIRCRAFT, FOR POSSIBLE OFFENSIVE --

A. THEY DO INDEED, WHICH GETS TO SOME OF THE OTHER QUESTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN ASKED; BUT THE DELETIONS HAVE BEEN MADE STRICTLY ON THE BASIS OF OUR TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER OR NOT, ACCORDING TO OUR RULES FOR RELEASE, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO RELEASE THEM

Q. YOU ARE SAYING, THEN, THAT THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ISRAELI COMPLAINTS THAT THE AIRCRAFT MIGHT BE USED IN A POSSIBLE ATTACK?

A. IN FACT, THE DECISION WAS MADE BEFORE THE ISRAELI COMPLAINTS AROSE, AS FAR AS I KNOW.

Q. SIR, CAN THE SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL TELL US IF THE ISRAELIS ARE SENDING OVER A TEAM TO STUDY THE AWACS, AND TO GET A FIRST-HAND BRIEFING ON THE RESTRICTIONS THAT ARE BEING IMPOSED ON THE SAUDI USE? AND IN THAT CONNECTION, WHAT IS THE PYRPOSE OF GENERAL RAPHAEL EITAN VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN MID-SEPTEMBER? IS THAT CONNECTED TO THE AWACS SALE?

A. I'M NOT AWARE OF GENERAL EITAN'S SCHEDULED VISIT, IF ONE IS SCHEDULED.

AND THE GENERAL ANSWER TO YOUR FIRST QUESTION IS NO.

Q. NO ISRAELI TEAM COMING OVER?

A. I DIDN'T SAY THAT. I SAID THAT THE GENERAL ANSWER IS NO, THAT IS, THERE IS NOT AN ISRAELI TEAM, AS FAR AS I KNOW, COMING HERE TO STUDY AWACS DELETIONS TACTICS, OR OTHER THINGS THAT APPLY TO THE SAUDI SALE

THE ISRAELIS ARE INTERESTED IN AWACS TECHNOLOGY, AND WE ARE HAVING A CERTAIN EXCHANGE WITH THEM.

Q. HAS THAT STARTED ALREADY?

A. IT'S NOT IN THE SAUDI CONTEXT, AS FAR AS I KNOW.

Q. IS THE UNITED STATES INTERESTED IN SELLING AWACS TO THE ISRAELIS, OR ARE THE ISRAELIS INTERESTED IN PURCHASING THEM?

A. THEY HAVE AN AWACS-TYPE AIRPLANE OF THEIR OWN. AND THEY'RE NOT INTERESTED IN IT, AS FAR AS I KNOW, AGAIN.

Q. ONE OF THE SENIOR OFFICIALS SAID EARLIER SOMETHING ABOUT THE LONGEVITY OF SUCH AIRCRAFT BEING SHORT LIVED IF THEY COME SOMEWHERE NEAR THE ISRAEL BORDER. ARE WE NOT GIVING PERMISSION TO ISRAEL TO KNOCK DOWN THESE AWACS IF THEY COME IN WITHIN RANGE OF PHOTOGRAPHING ISRAELI INSTALLATIONS?

A. THE AWACS DOESN'T PHOTOGRAPH ANYTHING. IT IS NOT AN INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING SYSTEM. IT LOOKS; IT BLIPS ON A LIVE PLANE FLYING AROUND. IT CAN REACH OUT A COUPLE OF HUNDRED MILES AND MORE, WHICH IS WHY IT IS ESSENTIAL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LOCATION OF THE OIL FIELDS TO A BORDER. SO, IF IT COMES CLOSE, AND IF THE ISRAELIS PERCEIVE THIS AS THREATENING TO ISRAEL, IT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE THAT THE ISRAELIS MAY TAKE MATTERS IN THEIR OWN HANDS.

Q. WHAT HAPPENS, THEN? DO WE HAVE ANOTHER EMBARGO?

A. YOU'LL HAVE TO ASK MY COLLEAGUE.

(LAUGHTER)

Q. SIR, LET ME FOLLOW UP ON THE PREVIOUS QUESTIONING. ARE WE ASKING THE SAUDIS TO PRECLUDE SOVIET

OVERFLIGHTS OVER SAUDI ARABIA TO THEIR BASES IN SOUTH YEMEN AND ETHIOPIA? ARE WE ASKING THE SAUDIS TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT IT WILL COME AROUND IN TIME IN THE NEXT FOUR OR FIVE YEARS, WHENEVER THE AWACS BECOME OPERATIONAL, TO RECOGNIZING 242 AND 338 -- ALL THESE QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE ARISEN WITH RESPECT TO ISRAEL AND ARAB RELATIONS, WHICH THIS PAPER DOES NOT SHOW, AND TO WHICH THIS BRIEFING DID NOT PROVIDE ANY CLUES.

A. WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS, THAT IS A QUESTION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND SAUDI ARABIA. IT MIGHT JUST REFLECT THE FACT THAT SAUDI ARABIA DOESN'T THINK IT HAS THE CAPABILITY OF DOING ANYTHING ABOUT IT. I DON'T KNOW. ASK THEM.

WITH RESPECT TO THOSE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, I WOULD REMIND YOU THAT JUST A FEW DAYS AGO, THE SAUDI ARABIANS ADVANCED AN EIGHT-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST

WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OUTLINED IN THOSE RESOLUTIONS.

Q. ON THAT POINT, IT DIDN'T SAY A WORD ABOUT THE REPORT OF 242 OR 338. IT'S NOT IN THERE.

A. DO YOU WANT TO ANSWER THAT ONE? (TO SEN OF OFFICIAL: ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SAUDI PLAN. DOES THAT NOT IN EFFECT SAY THAT THE --

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: IT IS NOT A SAUDI PLAN. THERE ARE EIGHT POINTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE PUBLIC. THE PROPOSALS FOR PEACE ON THE BASIS OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IS CLEARLY THE SAUDI EQUIVALENT OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF 242. BUT THAT IS NOT NEW; THAT'S NOT NEW.

WHAT IS NEW IS THAT A NUMBER OF PREVIOUS SAUDI POSITIONS HAVE BEEN PULLED TOGETHER IN ONE DOCUMENT, AND ARTICULATED AS SUCH.

Q SIR, YOU SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT YOU DON'T WISH TO BE BRACKETED ON THIS QUESTION OF OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS, AND I RESPECT THAT, EXCEPT THAT THE TONE OF SEVERAL OF THE QUESTIONS SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT THE PEOPLE LISTENING TO YOU ASSUME THAT THE RESTRICTIONS INVOLVE SAUDI ARABIAN AIR SPACE.

CAN YOU GET ENOUGH OUT OF YOUR BRACKETING TO -- ARE YOU TELLING US THAT THERE WOULD BE RESTRICTIONS ON THE SAUDI USE OF THE AIRCRAFT WITHIN SAUDI ARABIAN AIR SPACE?

A. I'M AFRAID I WOULD DESCRIBE THAT QUESTION AS AN ATTEMPT AT BRACKETING.

Q. IN OTHER WORDS, YOU WILL NOT SAY THAT?

A. I WILL NOT ANSWER THAT QUESTION BECAUSE IT IS THE QUESTION WE WANT TO ANSWER TO THE CONGRESS.

Q. THANK YOU

(THE BRIEFING CONCLUDED AT 4:06 P.M.) HAIG
UNQTE HAIG